This article analyses and discusses dilemmas, ambivalences and problematic issues related to research ethics. This is done firstly by making a distinction between procedural research ethics and particularistic research ethics. Such a distinction reflects a theoretical construction and generalization. In practice, there can be a very close correlation between the two types. In the following, the distinction will therefore be used as a starting point for the presentation of a pragmatic-dualist research ethics. The approach is dualist because it draws on (...) the presence of two independent, contrasting understandings, which are essentially different yet equal aspects of good research ethics; it is pragmatic because this dualism is structural and institutional by nature, and designed with an eye to what can realistically and expediently be done in practice. Thus the intention of the article is to both analyze and discuss two different understandings of research ethics and simultaneously qualify a research ethics that draws on both of these understandings. Furthermore, the intention is to visualize a different understanding of research ethics which others can address and elaborate on or qualify. Even at this point, this research ethic can be included in a catalogue of understandings of ethical research practice an can be exploited in ethical research practice. (shrink)

This article analyses and discusses research-ethical dilemmas, ambivalences and problematic issues. This is done firstly by making a distinction between procedural research ethics and particularistic research ethics. Such a distinction refl ects a theoretical construction and generalization – in practice there can be a very close correlation between the two types. Hereafter, the distinction will therefore be used as a jumping-off point for the presentation of a pragmatic-dualist research ethics. Th e approach is dualist because it draws on the presence (...) of two independent, contrasting understandings, which are essentially diff erent yet equal aspects of good research ethics; and it is pragmatic because this dualism is first and foremost structural and institutional by nature, and designed with an eye to what can realistically and expediently be done in practice. Thus the intention of the article is to both analyze and discuss two different understandings of research ethics and simultaneouslyqualify a research ethics that draws on both these understandings. At the same time, the intention is to try to visualize a diff erent understanding of research ethics which others can address and elaborate on or qualify but even at this point can be included in an arsenal or catalogue of research-ethical understandings and approaches that can be exploited in research-ethical practice. (shrink)

Når man går i gang med et forskningsprojekt, vil der typisk være nogle forskningsetiske problemstillinger, man skal forholde sig til. Det kan fx være, at man skal have indhentet informeret samtykkeerklæringer fra de deltagere, der skal være med, eller man skal have indhentet forskningsetiske tilladelser og godkendelser fra uafhængige instanser. Det er altså overvejelser, som typisk dukker op ved begyndelsen af et forskningsprojekt. Der kan efterfølgende være en risiko for, at man forsømmer refleksioner over emergerende etiske problemstillinger, og at forskningsetik (...) således reduceres til, at man som forsker har underskrevet og overholdt nogle prædefinerede retningslinjer for god forskningspraksis. Sådanne retningslinjer er naturligvis særdeles vigtige. Men det er pointen i denne artikel, at de ikke kan stå alene. Forskningsetiske dilemmaer er et epistemologisk vilkår gennem hele forskningsprocessen, og de må således overvejes og genovervejes, forhandles og genforhandles gennem hele forskningsprocessen. Den form for forskningsetik, der følger bestemte på forhånd fastlagte retningslinjer, som typisk er formuleret i standardiserede, kontekstuafhængige principper for god etisk adfærd, benævnes i artiklen procedural forskningsetik, mens en forskningsetik, der foretager en konkret og kontekstafhængig vurdering af de specifikke etiske problemstillinger og dilemmaer, som de viser sig i praksis gennem hele forskningsprocessen, benævnes kasuistisk forskningsetik. Distinktionen mellem disse to typer forskningsetik er udtryk for en teoretisk konstruktion, og de skal ikke betragtes som modsatrettede alternativer, men derimod som supplerende sider ved god forskningsetisk praksis. I artiklen diskuteres forholdet mellem dem for ad den vej at fremhæve enhver forskers pågående og kontinuerlige ansvar gennem hele forskningsprocessen. Nøgleord: forskningsetik, procedural, kasuistisk, Leibniz English summary: Dic cur hic – a casuistic research ethic When embarking on a research project, researchers must customarily confront some ethical issues. To begin with, they may need informed consent from the participants, or research ethics permission and approval from an independent Research Ethics Committee. However, there is more involved than these legal requirements alone, for just complying with some pre-defined guidelines for good research practice is by no means enough. In fact, a number of ethical issues demanding thorough reflection may emerge during the research project. Far from being neglected, such questions deserve careful attention. Research ethical dilemmas are an epistemological condition throughout the whole research process, and must therefore be constantly considered and reviewed, negotiated and renegotiated. This article purports to categorize the ethical issues likely to arise during the course of an investigation into two main types, namely procedural and casuistic. The kind of research ethics following certain pre-established guidelines, which are typically expressed in standardized, context-independent principles of good ethical behavior, will be labeled as procedural research ethics, while the type of research ethics ensuing from the analysis and contextual assessment of the specific dilemmas arising in practice in the particular situation studied, will be named casuistic research ethics. A distinction between these two types of research ethics reflects a theoretical construct. Both types should not be regarded as opposing alternatives, but as complementary aspects of good ethical research practices. This article discusses the relationship between the two types in order to highlight the researcher’s ongoing and continuous responsibility throughout the research process. (shrink)

These days there are many different understandings and definitions of the term aesthetics. Sometimes it is regarded as identical to the pleasing or the sensual, other times it has a more workaday meaning, being associated with e.g. a well-stocked lunch table. The common denominator, however, is that aesthetics is understood as something that can be recorded in the real world, having been assigned an independent existence. The concept has thus undergone ‘ontological dumping’, by which we understand that an analytical concept (...) has become a “thing in the world”, i.e. an epistemological state has been transformed into an ontological state. The problem with this is that what can potentially be used to understand has instead turned into something to be understood. In the endeavour not to downgrade the epistemological dimension in favour of the experiential dimension, we attempt in this article to re-establish aesthetics as an analytical concept: Something to be seen with – instead of something that is seen. In addition, we put it into perspective alongside culture and art, which we feel has undergone the same ontological dumping. The article concludes with some reflections on the implications this may have for educational practice. As its theoretical springboard, the article takes the philosopher Jean-François Lyotard, drawing its exemplary material from the Norwegian author Karl Ove Knausgård. (shrink)